What is the explanatory gap argument?
The explanatory gap, he argues, is epistemological rather than metaphysical: it is a gap in our understanding of how the physical facts make the mental facts true, a gap that would not be closed even if we accepted the thesis that the mental facts are made true by the physical facts.
What is the theory of mind in philosophy?
Theory of Mind is the branch of cognitive science that investigates how we ascribe mental states to other persons and how we use the states to explain and predict the actions of those other persons. More accurately, it is the branch that investigates mindreading or mentalizing or mentalistic abilities.
What is the epistemic gap?
an inferential disconnection between physical and phenomenal beliefs, the. anti-physicalist’s crucial epistemic gap involves a disconnection between. physical and phenomenal knowledge. (
What is an example of theory of mind?
To understand that people act in a way that is motivated by their desires (for example, I am hungry so I will reach for that apple) is to understand that other people have their own desires (she must be hungry), thus demonstrating a theory of mind, or attributing mental states to others.
Why is Quale important to psychology?
The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from the fact that they are often seen as being an possible refutation of physicalism.
What is epiphenomenon philosophy?
Epiphenomenalism is a position in the philosophy of mind according to which mental states or events are caused by physical states or events in the brain but do not themselves cause anything.
What is the explanatory gap in philosophy?
In philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist theories have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine.
What is the explanatory gap in Supervenience?
Explanatory gaps. The thesis of supervenience has called attention to a particularly striking difficulty about how to integrate talk about minds into a general scientific understanding of the world, a difficulty that arises both in the case of conscious states and in the case of intentional ones.
Does an epistemic gap necessarily entail a metaphysical gap?
Those wishing to use its existence to support dualism have often taken the position that an epistemic gap—particularly if it is a definite limit on our cognitive abilities—necessarily entails a metaphysical gap. Levine and others have wished to either remain silent on the matter or argue that no such metaphysical conclusion should be drawn.
Is there a gap in our understanding of nature?
The explanatory gap argument doesn’t demonstrate a gap in nature, but a gap in our understanding of nature. Of course a plausible explanation for there being a gap in our understanding of nature is that there is a genuine gap in nature.